Tuesday, February 27, 2018

Plato, Philo, and Jesus as "a God" by Paul Wernle 1904


Plato, Philo, and Jesus as "a God" by Paul Wernle 1904 [Professor Extraordinary of Modern Church History at the University of Basle]

From: The Beginnings of Christianity, Volume 2


Angels and demons were the connecting link between the remote God and the visible world for the popular belief. Philosophy substituted the 'Logoi' or the 'Logos' and the Holy Spirit for the angels.

Here Philo had paved the way for the Christians. He himself was a Platonist, feeling himself a stranger in this phenomenal world while his true home was in the world of ideas. He did not introduce the conception of Logos into Jewish thought. Stoic and Aristotelian philosophers had done that before him. But just as he appropriated the work of his Jewish predecessors to a very large extent, even where they followed other Greek philosophers, so he took up the conception of the Logos from this tradition, and adapted it to Platonic modes of thought by defining it more sharply, and by individualizing it both as regards God and as regards the world. Even in Philo we find the Logos called the "second God," and the Old Testament was interpreted with reference to him.

Nor was Philo the only forerunner in this direction.

In the Wisdom of Solomon the spirit of wisdom is described, in accordance with the Stoic doctrine, as an infinitely subtilized, universal reason that pervades everything and is yet distinct from God Himself.

Of Christian writers, St Paul was the first to look upon Christ as such an intermediary being, higher than all the angels, yet lower than God Himself, nor was the term Logos as yet applied to Him. It was no philosophical problem that had moved St Paul to take this view. He wished to find Christ in the whole of the Old Testament. This was only possible by depriving God and the angels of a great portion of the sphere of their activity. Jesus, however, thereby comes to be the God that actively works in the world.

Then the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews developed his Pauline theology by means of conceptions taken directly from Alexandrine sources. The world was created through the Son of God. He is the reflection of God's glory and the impress of His substance, upholding all things by the word of His power. In the 45th Psalm He is called God —of course as Son, i.e., as God in a secondary sense. The very word 'reflection' is used as an attribute of wisdom in the Wisdom of Solomon. But this disciple of Philo did not venture as yet to apply the word 'Logos' to Jesus.

In the prologue of the Fourth Gospel, however, this name appears clearly and unmistakably. "In the beginning was the Logos, and the Logos was with God, and the Logos was a God." Dependence on Philo's writings is possible, yet it is not even absolutely necessary to presuppose it. The cosmological character of the opening sentences clearly points to a philosophical source. Between God and the world stands the Logos. On the one hand He is with God, on the other everything is created by Him. He is called 'a' God, but not 'the' God; in exactly the same way Philo distinguished between God with and God without the article, and supported this distinction by Old Testament proofs. The most suitable name is Son of God, or rather the only Son, in distinction from the 'children' of God, who only become children by His mediation. He is not only the creator of the world but its supporter, as in Him is all life.

Now the fact is of great importance that the man who introduced the Logos into the Gospel was not himself a philosopher, nor did the problem of the mediation between God and the world cause him any anxiety or difficulty. It is for apologetic and not philosophical ends that he makes use of the theory of the Logos. If, therefore, he ascribes a cosmological signification to the Logos, notwithstanding all this, then he must have been determined to do so by a firmly established tradition. It was an accepted theory — derived either from Philo or elsewhere — that the Logos had created and supported the world. The evangelist accepts this view in order to make it the basis for the transition to the apologetic, which is the sole aim of the whole of his prologue.

Monday, February 26, 2018

And the word was a God by William McGirr 1854


...and the word was a God by William McGirr 1854

Inasmuch as Trinitarians lay great stress upon [John 1:1], to prove the second person in their triune God, which, for the information of my fellow citizens generally who do not understand the Greek language, I will give the original in Greek, with its various definitions in English, taken from the Rev. John Groves' Greek and English Dictionary, viz: "Logos"—a word, speech, language, eloquence, the word, divine word, Christ, an oration, discourse, a saying, proverb, fame, report, rumor, talk, thought, opinion, conception, reflection, reason, understanding, sense, proportion, analogy, account, cause, a computation, reckoning, a matter, affair, point, purpose, an appearance, show, pretence, a volume, book, treatise, a narrative, story, fable, &c.

Now, gentlemen, you may observe that this word has upwards of forty different meanings in English. Supposing I was to translate the first verse of John's Gospel: In the beginning was language, and the language was with God, and the language was God. Again: In the beginning was a [the] report, and the report was with God, and the report was God. Again: In the beginning was a [the] book, and the book was with God, and the book was God. Again: In the beginning was a [the] fable, and the fable was with God, and the fable was God. And so of all the rest of the definitions.

Now this would almost appear to make a confusion of language. I presume, for any person to translate the first verse of John's Gospel: In the beginning was a book or a fable, and the book or fable was with God, and the book or fable was God; be would be viewed by the mass of mankind as insane, commote or delirious. Notwithstanding it would be a good translation. Who would presume to say, that a book or a fable is God?

This appears to me to be a poor foundation to build upon to prove the doctrine of a Trinity. These things I have introduced in order to show the impropriety of laying too much stress upon the meaning of words, translated from a dead language. I may also observe that Dr, Campbell, though a Trinitarian, gives it as his opinion, that either speech, or reason, would be the most proper. Again: I will make one remark upon our translators, in order to show how prejudice can sway the judgment. We must bear in mind that the first definition is "a word." It would then read: In the beginning was a word, and the word was with God, and the word was a God. But mark how they leave the a out, but how carefully they attach it to Moses: "I have made thee a God to Pharaoh." And why so? Because they abhorred the idea of deifying Moses, but they wanted to deify Jesus, to make him the second person of their triune God. So much for poor human nature!

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Origen's Subordinationist Trinity By Alvan Lamson 1865


Origen's Subordinationist Trinity By Alvan Lamson 1865

We now proceed to Origen's views of the Son and Spirit. Like the preceding Fathers, he regarded the Son as the first production of the Father; having emanated from him as light from the sun, and thus partaking of the same substance; that is, a divine. He believed, however, that God and the Son constituted two individual essences, two beings. This belief he distinctly avows in more than one instance, and the general strain of his writings implies it. He disclaims being of the number of those "who deny that the Father and Son are two substances"; and proceeds to assert that they "are two things as to their essence, but one in consent, concord, and identity of will." He quotes the Saviour's words, "I and my Father are one," which he explains as referring solely to unity of will and affection; and refers, in illustration, to Acts iv. 32: "And the multitude of them that believed were of one heart and one soul." Again: from the circumstance that Jesus is called "light" in the Gospel of John (i. 4, 5, 9), and, in his Epistle (1 John i. 5), God is said to be "light," some, he observes, may infer that "the Father does not differ from the Son in essence." But this inference, he proceeds to say, would be wrong; for "the light, which shines in darkness, and is not comprehended by it, is not the same with that in which there is no darkness at all." The Father and the Son, he then says, are "two lights." This, surely, is not the reasoning of a Trinitarian. Once more: he expresses his disapprobation of the hypothesis that "the Spirit has no proper essence diverse from the Father and Son," and adds, "We believe that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are three essences, or three substances."

Let us next hear what he says of the inferiority of the Son. Jerome, who had access to several of his works which are now lost, or have come down to us in a corrupt and mutilated form, accuses him of saying that "the Son was not begotten, but made"; that, "compared with the Father, he is a very small light, which appears great to us on account of our feebleness." Again: Origen, he says, "takes the example of two images, a larger and smaller; of which one fills the world, and becomes in some sort invisible by its magnitude; the other falls within the limits of distinct vision. To the former he compares the Father; to the latter, the Son." He attributes, continues Jerome, "perfect goodness" only to the " Omnipotent Father," and does not allow "the Son to be good" (that is, in an absolute sense), "but only a certain breath and image of goodness."

But let us listen to Origen himself. In his commentaries on John, he pronounces "God the Logos," or Son, to be "surpassed by the God of the universe." Commenting on John i. 3, "All things were made by him," he observes, that the particle by or through (DIA), is never referred to the primary agent, but only to the secondary and subordinate; and he takes, as an example, Heb. i. 2, "By whom also he made the worlds," or ages. By this expression, he says, Paul meant to teach us that "God made the ages by the Son" as an instrument. So he adds, in the place under consideration, "If all things were made (DIA) through the Logos, they were not made (UPO) by him" (that is, as the primary cause), "but by a greater and better; and who can that be but the Father?" Again: Jesus is called the "true light"; and in "proportion as God, the Father of truth, is greater than truth, and the Father of wisdom is more noble and excellent than wisdom, — in the same proportion," says Origen, "he excels the true light." Again: the Son and Spirit, he says, "are excelled by the Father, as much or more than they excel other beings." — "He is in no respect to be compared with the Father; for he is the image of his goodness, and the effulgence, not of God, but of his glory and of his eternal light; and a ray, not of the Father, but of his power, and a pure emanation of his most powerful glory, and a spotless mirror of his energy." Again: "The Father, who sent him (Jesus), is alone good, and greater than he who was sent."

Again: Origen contends that Christ is not the object of supreme worship; and that prayer, properly such, ought never to be addressed to him, but is to be offered to the God of the universe, through his only-begotten Son, who, as our intercessor and high priest, bears our petitions to the throne of his Father and our Father, of his God and our God. On this subject he is very full and explicit. "Prayer is not to be directed," he says, "to one begotten,—not even to Christ himself; but to the God and Father of the universe alone, to whom also our Saviour prayed, and to whom he teaches us to pray. When his disciples said, 'Teach us to pray,' he taught them to pray, not to himself, but to the Father, saying, 'Our Father, who art in heaven.' For if the Son," he continues, "be different from the Father in essence, as we have proved in another place, we must either pray to the Son, and not to the Father, or to both, or to the Father alone. But no one is so absurd as to maintain that we are to pray to the Son, and not to the Father. If prayer is addressed to both, we ought to use the plural number, and say, 'Forgive, bless, preserve ye us,' or something like it; but as this is not a fit mode of address, and no example of it occurs in the Scriptures, it remains that we pray to the Father of the universe alone." He adds, "But as he, who would pray as he ought, must not pray to him who himself prays, but to Him whom Jesus our Lord taught us to invoke in prayer (namely, the Father), so no prayer is to be offered to the Father without him; which he clearly shows when he says (John xvi. 23, 24), 'Verily, verily, I say unto you, Whatsoever ye shall ask the Father in my name, he shall give it you. Hitherto ye have asked nothing in my name: ask, and ye shall receive, that your joy may be full.' For he does not say, 'Ask me,' nor 'Ask the Father,' simply; but, 'If ye shall ask the Father in my name, he shall give it you.' For, until Jesus had thus taught them, no one had asked the Father in the name of the Son; and what he said was true: 'Hitherto ye have asked nothing in my name.'" And again: "What are we to infer," asks Origen, "from the question, 'Why call ye me good? There is none good but one, — God the Father.' What but that he meant to say, 'Why pray to me? It is proper to pray to the Father alone, to whom I pray, as ye learn from the Scriptures. For ye ought not to pray to him who is constituted by the Father high priest for you, and who has received the office of advocate from the Father, but through the high priest and advocate, who can be touched with the feeling of your infirmities; having been tempted in all respects as ye are, but, by the gift of the Father, tempted without sin. Learn, therefore, how great a gift ye have received of my Father; having obtained, through generation in me the spirit of adoption, by which ye have a title to be called the sons of God and my brethren, as I said to the Father concerning you, by the mouth of David, "I will declare thy name to my brethren; in the midst of the assembly I will sing praise to thee." But it is not according to reason for a brother to be addressed in prayer by those who are glorified by the same Father. Ye we to pray to the Father alone, with and through me.'"

This we take to be sound Unitarianism. Indeed, the question of the impropriety of addressing the Son in prayer could not have been better argued by the most strenuous advocate for the divine unity at the present day.

We have thus shown, as we think, conclusively, that Origen believed God and the Son to be two essences, two substances, two beings; that he placed the Son at an immense distance from the Infinite One, and was strongly impressed with the impropriety of addressing him in prayer, strictly so called; that he viewed him, however, as standing at the head of all God's offspring, and with them, and for them, as his younger brethren, whom he had been appointed to teach and to save, offering prayer at the throne of the Eternal. Still Origen does not hesitate to apply the terms "creature" and "made" to him, and asserts that he was begotten, not from an inner necessity, but "by the will of the Father, the first-born of every creature."

To the Spirit, Origen assigned a place below the Son, by whom, according to him, it was made. To the Spirit the office of redeeming the human race properly pertained; but, it being incompetent to so great a work, the Son, who alone was adequate to accomplish it, engaged.* The Father, he says, pervades all things; the Son, only beings endowed with reason; and the Holy Spirit, only the sanctified, or saved.

We have reserved for the last place a very remarkable passage relating to the comparative rank of the Father, Son, and Spirit. It contains a plain and direct assertion, and is enough of itself to decide the question respecting Origen's opinions. He says, "Greater Is The Power Of The Father Than That Of The Son And The Holy Spirit; And Greater That Of The Son Than That Of The Holy Spirit; And Again, The Power Of The Holy Spirit Surpasses That Of Other Holy Things." Such language needs no comment. - metatron3@gmail.com

Sunday, February 25, 2018

And the Logos was a god, by John Samuel Thompson 1828


And the Logos was a god, by John Samuel Thompson [Translator of: A Monotessaron; Or The Gospel of Jesus Christ, According to the Four Evangelists, Harmonized and Chronologically Arranged in a New Translation from the Greek Text of Griesbach by the Rev. John S. Thompson 1828]

In the beginning existed the Logos, and the Logos was with God, and the Logos was a god.

1. John asserts that the Logos was with God in the beginning. In this proposition John does not affirm that the Logos was eternal, nor that he was created in the beginning; but only, that at the time this world was formed, the Logos then existed. Now if we compare the writings of Plato, Philo and the Philosophers in general, we shall find a double sense attached to the word Logos. The first merely conceptual or ideal, being nothing more than a personification of the wisdom or mind of the Deity. The second personal or substantial, being the appellative of the Son of God, when he became a real personal existence. Hence the distinction of the internal and external Logos. Whitby says: "The primitive Fathers very plainly and frequently affirm, that the Logos was strictly from all eternity, in the Father, but was produced or emitted before the creation of the world." In proof of which position he cites Justin, Athenagoras, Theophilus, Tertullian, Tatian, and Lactantius; and refers to Bull's Defence of the Nicene Creed.

Theodoret and Augustine are quoted by Corneil a Lapide, in proof that Orpheus and many of the Greek, Chaldean, and Egyptian philosophers called the supreme God, Nous or Mind, and his word, the offspring of the Mind, they denominated Logos. Let us hear Tertullian, in his Apology, addressing the heathen philosophers: "You philosophers yourselves, admit that the Logos, the word and reason, was the creator of the Universe; the Christians merely add: that the proper substance of the word and reason, is spirit; that this word must have been pronounced by God, and when pronounced, it was generated, and, consequently, it is the Son of God." "Thought, says Bossuet, which we feel produced as the offspring of our minds, as the son of our understanding, gives us some idea of the Son of God; for this reason, this Son of God, assumes the name of the Word, to intimate that he was produced in the bosom of the Father, as the inward voice arises in our souls when we contemplate truth."

John Benedict Carpsove and Professor Paulus, of Jena, have shown that besides the merely conceptual Logos, which was allowed to have always existed in the Father, Philo and many of the Jews and philosophers, attached the notion of personal subsistence to the Logos.— Dr. A. Clarke, on this passage, says: "after a serious reading of the Targums, it seems to me evident that the Chaldee term memra or word, is used personally in a multitude of places, and to attempt to give the word any other meaning in various places, would be flat opposition to every rule of construction." There is therefore one principle, in which Philosophers, Learned Jews, and the primitive Christian fathers were united: From all eternity the Logos existed, not personally, but as the reason and voice, or mind and word of God, but before the creation or commencement of time, Jehovah begot, or produced this word as a personal existence, his Son. In this latter sense, the Logos is here introduced by John, as existing with, not in God, at the beginning of time and creation; and hence John plainly teaches the personal pre-existence of Christ, as appears manifest from the whole scope of the passage, and several parts of his Gospel. The word beginning, therefore, has the same import here as in Gen.1.1.; and to interpret it to mean the beginning of the Gospel, is to divest the whole passage of force and meaning; for what propriety could there be in saying, Jesus existed when he began to preach? None! Therefore John says the Logos had life in him before he became man.

2. The Logos was a god. John does not teach that the Logos was God, in the absolute sense of the term; but in a subordinate sense. Those who contend for the supreme deity of the Logos, assert that the construction of the Greek, is such as warrants their conclusion; for say they, the word God, being the predicate of the proposition, should not have the article. Admitting this, we say, on the other hand, that had John intended to say the Logos was a god, no other form of expression could have been used, than that found in the original text: whereas had he intended to say the word is the supreme God, he could have used a different form, and have said ho theos en ho logos. Thus Origen, on this passage says: "when the word God is used to denote the self-existent being who is the author of the Universe, John places the article before it, but withholds the article when the Logos is called God." Eusebius contra Marcellum de eccles. Theol. L. 11, 17, observes that "the article is here omitted, that the Evangelist might teach a distinction between the Father and the Son; otherwise he might have said ho theos en ho logos, had he intended to call the Father and the Son the same being." See the first of these quotations in Rosenmuller, and the latter in Lampe, on this passage. Epiphanius also, cited by Pearson on the Creed, observes that if we say ho theos, God with the article, we mean the living and true God, but if we say theos, God without the article, we mean a heathen god. Hence the ablest Greek critics among the ancient fathers, who knew an hundred fold more about the construction and usage of the language than the modern critics, say John could have used the article in this phrase, had he intended to designate the Logos as the supreme God.

From what has been said it will follow, that John used the word God, when characteristic of the Logos, in a subordinate and relative sense; and this he might do, either as a Jew, following the usage of the holy Scriptures, or in imitation of the Grecian philosophers. The Hebrew Scriptures use the term God to denote beings of the Angelic order. Compare Psalm 97. 7, with Heb. 1. 6. Thus also in Psalm 86. 8, where the Hebrew says, "there is none among the gods like unto thee," the Chaldaic version says, there is none among the angels of heaven like unto thee." Jesus tells the Jews, "the law called them gods to whom the word of God came. John 10. 35. Hence we see the term god, used in the scriptures, in a subordinate sense; and we have reason to believe that it is so used in this introduction; for John could not intend to say the Logos was the same, as the God in whose presence he was.

3. All things animate or inanimate were made by the Logos. Against this proposition, two objections are made. 1. That out of about 300 instances, where the preposition dia with a genitive occurs, in the New Testament, not more than three can be found to denote the first or efficient cause: but uniformly this construction marks the instrumental cause of an action. Consequently the Father, and not the Son, is the Creator. 2. The verb egeneto never signifies to create. Now both these objections may be admitted, in their full force and extent, and yet the proposition; That all things were made by the Son, be true and perfectly maintainable. The ancient philosophers, as well as many very eminent modern writers on Cosmogony, have maintained a two-fold creation, or rather a creation and formation. A creation, strictly so named, in which the elements of things are called from nonentity into being: a formation, by which things receive their figure and adaptation for their destined use, in actual being: The first may be called a creation of essence, the second of forms of being. It is readily granted, that the scriptures uniformly describe the Father as acting through the agency of his Son: and if John contemplated the agency of the Logos in the formation of "things, his words and phrases are well adapted to express his meaning with caution and perspicuity. "What part belonged to the Son in Creation, says Rosenmuller, no mortal should dare to explain. The Ancients thus understood and believed; that the Father was the disposer of all things, but that in finishing what he had disposed, he used the agency of his Son." Lactantius de Sapien. L. 4, C. 9, says, the philosophers were not ignorant of the Logos, for even Zeno denominates the maker and disposer of the world, Logos. Philo, de Mundi Opificio, says, when the Deity decreed to form this mighty globe, he conceived the forms thereof, and afterwards constituted this intelligent world after the model he had conceived: and if it please any one to speak more openly, this archetype of the intelligible world, this idea of ideas was the Word of God." Hence the philosophers of that time and some of the Fathers, even Origen and Augustine, held the Son to be an inter-medium, if I may so say, between the Deity and the material world; as if some being more nearly connected with creation, than the eternal spirit, should be the agent in the formation of things. The Apostle Paul expressly declares all things visible and invisible were created in the Son, and by his agency, and for his use, Col. 1. 16. And again: by him God made the worlds, Heb. 1. 2. I know it is objected that the word AIWNAS of should be translated ages, but this need not be granted; for the same term is used in chap. 11. 3, of this epistle, to signify the material world: and Michaelis observes, in his notes on Pierce's Commentary, that the Jews, in their most solemn acts of devotion, address God as the Creator of the ages; doubtlessly meaning by the term ages, this system of the Universe. The Apostle Paul and the Evangelist John, therefore, clearly unite in the sentiment of the philosophers of their times, in ascribing the formation of all things to the Son of God, and hence they place him before all things, for this very reason. Surely there can be no more impossibility in Christ's agency in the forming of this world and man upon it, than in his raising the dead, calming the winds, and suspending the action of nature's laws. John tells us the world was made by the Logos. In this we believe him; but let those who say the world was not made, but only renewed or enlightened by the Logos, account for the inconceivable ignorance or wickedness of this enlightened and renewed world, in not knowing or acknowledging the Son of God!

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Friday, February 23, 2018

Philo and the Logos as the Second God, by Kenneth Sylvan Guthrie 1899

Philo, and the Logos as the Second God, by Kenneth Sylvan Guthrie 1899

1. The Prologue.—In reading the New Testament, there is one short passage, the Prologue to the Fourth Gospel, which attracts attention by its peculiarity, and difference from all other books. In it we meet the Philonic conception of the Logos, applied to Jesus of Nazara. Nowhere else in the New Testament do we meet with it. The word "Logos" occurs in the Synoptics, but only in the sense of human reason or discourse. We meet the term suddenly without any explaination of it, as if it must be familiar to everybody.

How shall we account for this fact?

That it is a Philonic term, no one can doubt. The only question can be, was it taken from Philo's writings at first hand, or only indirectly? Meyer, Lucke, Reuss, Beyschlag, Weizsacker, Harnack, plead for the first alternative; Luthardt, Weiss, Liddon, Godet and Plummer plead for the second.

The earliest date for the Fourth Gospel is usually accepted to be 70-100 A. D.; many religious authorities accepting 99 A. D. Philo flourished 40-50 A. D.; so that there would have been plenty of time for popular acquaintance with his doctrine. To this must be added the fact that the Targums had circulated among the Palestinian Jews and the Apocryphal literature among the Greek-speaking Jews for several centuries, so that in any case Philo's use of the term Logos cannot have been strange or unfamiliar in the conception it represented. Such conditions would greatly favour rapid spread of his doctrine, especially if we remember that we must consider Philo as summing up the partial labours of many Jews before him, and not as a philosopher who had introduced in the world of thought a new idea or occupied a new mental stand-point.

Yet these explainations do not give us a satisfactory answer to the question, how shall we account for the appearance of the Logos in this Prologue?

Many commentators have held that in this Prologue the author of the Fourth Gospel purposely gives us a definite, distinct outline of the philosophy of Christianity, or a divinely revealed account of cosmology as the knowledge of it is in God, and as it is revealed by the Spirit.

Such a claim is however seen to be doubtful when we can trace every element of this divine revelation in the works of pagans or Jews, whom nobody has ever held to be divinely inspired, and none of whom claimed it themselves. Such a claim must then be considered unfounded or at least unproven. How then shall we account for it?

2. Only Mention of the Logos.—We may point out again, in the first place, how familiar the conception of the Logos seems to be to the writer, and how familiar he assumes it to be to those to whom or for whom he is writing. Some commentators have then supposed that the writer used these familiar terms to explain what he meant, just as Paul, in his Epistles of the imprisonment used the Gnostic term "fulness" and modern theologians use the concept of evolution in their sermons. Stevens says: "It is as if John had said to his readers: 'You are familiar with the speculations which have been long rife respecting tha means whereby God reveals himself,—the doctrine of an intermediate agent through whom he communicates his life and light to men. The true answer to the question regarding this mediator is, that it is our Lord Jesus Christ. He is God's agent in revelation; he is the bond which unites heaven and earth."'

We have seen that except in this Prologue, the Logos not mentioned anywhere in the New Testament. Harnack sees in th1s fact the following significance:

"The Prologue of the Gospel is not the key to the understanding of the Gospel, but it prepares the Hellenistic readers therefor. The writer seizes upon a known quantity, the Logos, works it over and transforms it—implicitly combating false christologies —in order to substitute for it Jesus Christ, the only begotten Son, that is, in order to disclose it as being this same Jesus Christ. From the moment when this is done, the Logos-idea is allowed to fall away. The author continues his narrative now fully concernng Jesus, in order to establish the Faith that he is the Messiah the Son of God. This belief has for its principal element the recognition that Jesus originates from God and from heaven; but the author is far removed from the purpose of securing this recognition from cosmological and philosophical considerations. Upon the basis of his testimony, and because he has taught the full knowledge of God and life—absolutely heavenly and divine benefits—-he leaves Jesus prove himself, according to the Evangelist, to be the Messiah, the Son of God."

3. Was the Conception of the Logos the Traditional One?—It may be asked, if the writer of the Fourth Gospel took the conception of Logos to illustrate what he believed of the person of Jesus of Nazara, did he do so unreservedly, or did he alter the conception of the Logos?

To answer this question it will be necessary to turn to the Prologue itself. A literal translation of the first few verses is as follows:

"In the beginning was the Logos, and the Logos was with 'The God,' and the Logos was 'God.'"

"He (the Logos) was in the beginning with 'The God,' etc."

Now, a glance at the doctrine of Philo will show us that the writer of the Prologue has reproduced the very technical terms of Philo, distinguishing between "The God," and "God."

If the writer had intended to depart consciously from Philo's doctrine, he would have written: "In the beginning was the Logos, and the Logos was with "The God," and the Logos was "The God." He was in the beginning with "The God," etc.

Besides, knowing that Philo's doctrine, distinguishing between "The God," and "God," was widely known, if he intended to depart from it, he would not only have made that alteration suggested, but would have distinctly said: "This doctrine of the Logos with which you are acquainted represents our conception of the person of Jesus of Nazara admirably, with this exception: that while with Philo the Logos is only "God," and not "The God," our conception of Jesus distinctly requires that he should be called "The God," as well as the Father who is "The God."

This would be especially the case, since this would be the very crucial point of dispute.

If, however, we suppose that the writer of the Fourth Gospel believed the Logos to be fully as divine as the Father, and wrote as he did we must assume the following facts:

I. While knowing that the Philonic conception assigned a dependent and inferior rank to the Logos, and that this very terminology indicated that fact, he used it, without the slightest alteration.

II. He made the distinction indicated ("God" without the article) between two occurrences of the words "The God" consciously knowing that this was a very conspicuous place, and by making it here he would acknowledge he was cognisant of the Philonic distinction.

III. Although his conception of the Logos had changed, yet he used the old terminology unchanged, in the very crucial point, and in a place where it would have been singularly easy to change it, and to make the change very prominent.

Such assumptions are, however, absurd on their face, and can only be held if we have a case to make out.

Perhaps the best way in which we will be able to reach some knowledge of what he meant exactly will be to inquire how thsecondemporary and later writers interpreted this his statement, or conception of the cosmical Logos. To the answer of this question we will devote the Second Book of this Essay.

4. Pearson's Explanation.—In a future Chapter we shall see that Paul makes the same distinction between "God" and "The God" which we find in the prologue of the Fourth Gospel. It cannot be chance, or individual characteristics which dictated such a distinction ; there must have been a settled purpose.

Pearson, being ignorant of the Philonic origin of the distinction, considers it a mere captious objection, founded on a passage of Epiphanius, where "God" is the god or gods of the Gentiles, but "The God" the divinity of Jews and Hebrews.

Such ignorance would be its own refutation in the eyes of all fair-minded persons, if observed in any author other than Pearson. He endeavours to break down the distinction by noting that in many places in which God the Father is referred to (in his own opinion) the word "God" is used; as in: "There was a man sent from God whose name was John" and "no man hath ever seen God at any time."

Yet Pearson does not endeavour to show any passage in which Christ is spoken of as "The God." If he had, the distinction would break down. But he cannot, for there is no such passage in the New Testament.

We may easily explain the fact that in very many places God the Father is referred to as simply "God." Before the Philonic conception was made, God was always referred to as "God," as for instance by Plato. Long habit then had made it usual to refer the highest divinity the name "God," and so except where the metaphysical distinction was consciously made, it was usual to use the traditional name. Satisfactory as this explanation is, and impossible as it is to quote an instance in which "the God" is referred to Christ (which should be possible if, as Pearson claims, the terms are synonymous as to meaning, without any particular distinction), it is capable of proof that wherever the Father and Christ are mentioned together, and the Father is called " God," there Christ has no divinity at all ascribed to him, the natural inference being to the contrary. "But to us there is but one 'God,' the Father, of whom are all things, and we in him; and one Lord Jesus Christ, by whom are all things, and we by him." Here it is asserted that there is but one God, and that this one only God is the Father. Next is mentioned "our Lord Jesus Christ." He cannot then be God, inasmuch as there is but one God, and that one God is the Father.

Besides this explanation, we have still one more to offer; it would be possible to call the Father God as well as "The God," because "God" is in "The God." But "The God" is not in "God." All roses are flowers; but not all flowers roses. Thus, all "God" is "The God," but not all "The God" is "God." Thus we might with perfect propriety speak of the Father as "God," even while recognizing Philo's metaphysical distinction.

5. The Meaning of the Doctrine.—Merely to prove that the Logos-idea of the Fourth Gospel is Philonic is not sufficient; we must show what the Philonic conception of the Logos is.

The Logos is the highest manifestation of the power of God; "all things were made by him; and without him was not anything made that was made." He mediates between "The God" and man. so that he represents "The God" to man. "The God" himself is far above all description or comprehension; so that we only know him through the Logos. Consequently, "The God" is God, wisdom, knowledge, power and love in a superlative sense; whereas the Logos is God, wisdom, knowledge, power and love in a proper and actual sense.

It is this fact which is lost sight of by many theologians. They forget that if we follow Philo, we may call the Logos very God, and Divine Knowledge Will and Power, without in the least impugning his subordination to "The first God." Philo considers the Logos only a "God" in a secondary sense, in a secondary degree of existence, depending for its cause and ground absolutely on the first. Whereas "The first God" is above all definition, the "second God" may be both defined, and his qualities may be spoken of. It is evident that the comprehensible is less than the incomprehensible, the undefinable more than the definable and describable. And whereas the "second God" absolutely depends on "The God," "The God" does not depend on the "second God."

We repeat that this fact is usually lost sight of by theologians. They think as Bishop Bull, in his Defense of the Nicene Creed, does, that if they can prove that a Church Father called the Logos God, then they have disproved that he is a subordinationist, even if he speaks of a "second God." Then they consider him orthodox in the Athanasian sense, which involves the additional difficulty  that the Son is both begotten of the Father and equal to him. On the contrary, the Church Father in question affirms that the Logos is God, but holds his absolute subordination to "The God" in a deeper sense, so that the Son's Divinity is based on his dependence on the Father; not that the Son is equal to the Father by virtue of his Divinity.

Wherever then, in later history, we hear of a "second God" or of a secondary grade of Being, we must recognize Philo's strictly subordinational view, even if the Logos is called very God; the inconsistence thus being only apparent, which would be an actual contradiction in terms with the Athanasian conception.


[Also from this author: The externalized Logos is not only a divine power, but is also a personal being which stands mid-way between God and the world. He is the Mediator between them, teaching man the laws and commandments of God, and presenting to God a plea for man. He is the high-priest. Thus the Logos is different from both, being neither unbegotten, nor brought forth like other creatures, in degree. He is the older, first-born Son; all else is the younger son of God. Of this offspring God is the Father, and Wisdom the Mother. Referring to Gen.xxxi: 12,13, LXX, Philo says: "Let us examine carefully as to whether there are really two Gods, for it is said 'I am the God who appeared to thee' not in my place, but 'in the place of God' (Bethel), as if another deity were referred to. How are we to treat this statement? The explanation is that the true God is one, but those improperly so called are many. The Sacred Scripture, therefore, denotes the true God by the article,saying, 'I am The God' (Ho Theos),and in the other case omits it: 'Who appeared to thee in the place,' not of 'The God,' but merely 'of God.' Here he calls his eldest Logos God, having no superstitious feeling about the application of names."

Inasmuch as the Logos appears as the representant of God, he may also be called God; but with this distinction: The unbegotten God is called "The God," the Logos is called "God," without the article. The Logos is the "second God," and "the highest angel;" as the Platonic archetypal idea of man, he may be called the divine man.

The Logos is not the only divine power, there are other Logi who are distinct from him, and subordinated to him. They are not distinctly conceived by Philo, who at one time looks upon them as mere ideal revelations of God's power, and at another, as personal beings, who are the servants of God in the creation and guidance of the world. Their number is also indefinite: at one time they are only two, the creative and ruling powers; at another fiv : the creative, ruling, commanding, forbidding and forgiving powers. Here we have a clear representation of the Persian angelology.]

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Thursday, February 22, 2018

The Word was a god, and Origen, by William Allen 1860


The Word was a god, and Origen, by William Allen 1860

From A Book of Christian Sonnets By William Allen 1890


According to our English Bible the Son of God under the name of the Word seems to be called God by the apostle John, ch. 1, v. 1. But it was not the purpose of John to represent the Word as the infinite, supreme, almighty God. Origen, who wrote in Greek, in the third century, and understood the language better than any modern critic, says, that John's assertion is that, "the logos, or word, was a god," using the word god in its inferior, well-known sense, as is proved by his omission of the article. If he had inserted the article, he would have said, that "the logos was the God, the supreme God, Jehovah." The plain teaching is, there is one God. With him was the logos in the beginning, an exalted, glorious being; a second, inferior God; a being derived from God; and in this sense a divine being.—Besides Origen, Philo and several other fathers of the three first centuries speak of John's omission of the article here as a proof that by the word god he did not mean the Supreme God. Consider also, that if the logos existed "with God," then he was not the very God, with whom he existed.—On the other hand, it is a matter of no weight that when the supreme God is meant, yet the article is often omitted; for it is an established principle that it may be omitted when the name of God is sufficiently definite without it. In John 1: 6,—"a man sent from God:" here is an omission of it as unnecessary. So v. 12,13,18. Origen again says,—"Angels are called gods because they are divine; but we are not commanded to worship them in the place of God, and hence they are not really gods." He says, the article is withheld, when what is called god is a being different from the self-existent God, having a communicated divinity, being a divine person. Such also was the opinion of Clemens, Alexandrinus and Eusebius; and they were men more competent to decide a matter concerning the construction of the Greek language than any modern critic.—In several of the first centuries it was the judgment of such Fathers as Justin, Athenagoras, Tatian, Theophilus, Clemens, Origen, &c., that the word god as applied to Christ denoted a celestial nature, superior to all creatures, but inferior to the Supreme God. But the authority of Christ himself is more decisive,—"My Father is greater than I:" and the whole of scripture shows, that the one perfect God and his Son are two distinct intelligent Beings. As the word in Greek, Acts 28: 6, has no article our translators have very properly said "a god." If any one will look at 2 Thess. 2: 4, he will see, that the word God occurs four times and undistinguished in the English Testament, but in the Greek the word for God appears once—"in the temple of God" —with the article, shewing that the true Supreme God is meant,— and three times without the article, showing, that the word is used in an inferior sense, that a false god was intended. Dr. Macknight's translation is as follows,—"above every one, who is called a god or an object of worship. So that he, in the temple of God, as a god sitteth, openly shewing himself, that he is a god." It is thus, that the Word in John 1st is called a god, and not God the Supreme, the Almighty Jehovah.

When Tatian, about A. D. 165 speaks of "a god, who was born in the form of man" and of "the suffering God," he certainly did not mean, that Christ was the Supreme God, incapable of suffering. 

From: Unitarianism the Doctrine of the Gospel: A View of the Scriptural Grounds on Unitarianism from Lant Carpenter - 1817

"...the meaning of the Apostle may, probably, be more correctly represented as follows:
'At the beginning' of this grand era in the moral world, 'he was' declared to be 'the Word; and the Word was with God,' favoured by Him with peculiar divine intercourse and communications, (referring to the period of our Lord's retirement in the Desert;) 'and the Word was a God,' since to him the word of God came, and he was the Representative of the Most High. 'All things' relative to the Gospel dispensation 'were done through him;' he was the appointed agent in all.— Ver. 10. 'He was in the world, and the world' of mankind 'were formed anew' (or brought into an enlightened state) 'by him, and yet the world knew him not.'
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Wednesday, February 21, 2018

"The Word was a God" from a 1695 Tract

"The WORD was a God; there is, saith Socinus, but One God: Therefore when the WORD is here called a God, it must be meant in a Sense of Office, or of Mission, or of Representation, (not of Nature;) as Moses, and others, are (confessedly) called Gods in Scripture...Socinus saw plainly, that St. John having at first called the WORD (or the Lord Christ ) a God; that he might equal him to Moses, (Author of the Jewish State) who Is so called in Scripture: therefore to carry on the Metaphor, he speaks of him throughout, in the Terms of Creation." ~Sept 29, 1694

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The Unitarian Response to: I and My Father are One by Winthrop Bailey 1822


I and My Father are One by Winthrop Bailey 1822

CHRISTIANs agree in admitting the truth of all that is taught in the oracles of God. The opposite opinions, which they hold on many subjects, are to be traced to their different interpretations of the sacred volume. The Calvinist and Arminian, the Trinitarian and Unitarian, adopt, each, their peculiar views of doctrine, not because each rejects the passages, on which the other relies; but because each prefers his own explanation of those passages. In order then to know what is the truth, we must inquire, not merely respecting the words of scripture, but respecting the meaning also; we must understand, not so much the literal, as the real, import; we must ascertain, not only what the language is capable of denoting, but what it actually denotes. There is reason to think, that the sound is sometimes more regarded, than the sense; and that, in support of a favourite theory, expressions are advanced in a sense different from what they are admitted to bear in other passages.

These remarks have been suggested by the use, which has often been made, and which is still made, of the passage, selected for the theme of this discourse. It is often quoted to prove the supreme divinity of Jesus Christ; or that he and the Father are one and the same God. As it is found in the scriptures, however, it proves no such doctrine. In order to be made a proof of this, something must be added to it by human authority. Our Lord did not say; I and my Father are one being, or one God; nor does his language naturally lead to such a result. I shall endeavour to show, that the passage is not to be understood in this sense; and that, on the other hand, Christ and the Father are two distinct beings. In order to show, that the text is not to be understood as implying, that Christ and the Father are one being, or one God, I would observe,

First, that, in the verses preceding, and following, our Lord plainly represented himself as one being, and his Father as another. As a proof of the safety of his followers, he said, “My Father, who gave them me, is greater than all; and none is able to pluck them out of my Father's hand. But, after having mentioned himself as their protector, nothing could be added to the assurance of their safety by representing the Father as engaged in their defence, if he were the same being. If God said, ‘I give unto them eternal life; and they shall never perish, neither shall any pluck them out of my hand,’ what more could be said: But if this was said by a being distinct from God, and inferior to him, we see the propriety of what follows respecting the Father, and their safety in his hand.

If it be said, that there is a personal distinction between Christ and the Father; this is admitted; and the consequence is, they are not equal. “My Father is greater than all.” Of course, whether he is God, or a divine person, no other person can be equal to him. On another occasion Christ said; 'My Father is greater than I.’ Who then shall undertake to say they are equal, and the same" When Christ said, ‘I and my Father are one;’ and “My Father is greater than I; he doubtless uttered that which is consistent with itself. Both expressions are consistent with the Unitarian doctrine, as they now stand; or in the sense, in which similar phrases are known to be used. But the Trinitarian is under the necessity of putting an arbitrary construction on both. The first, he supposes to mean, ‘I and my Father are one being.' This interpretation, it is presumed, cannot be supported by any similar example. The other he explains to signify, that the Father is greater in office than the Son. But with what apparent reason is such an interpretation given to the words:
 
When the Jews accused our Lord of representing himself to be God; he answered by showing that the word, God, is not limited to the Supreme Being. ‘If he called them gods, unto whom the word of God came,’ &c. Had he called himself, therefore, by this name, it would not follow, either that he was guilty of blasphemy, or that he was the Supreme God. Our Saviour added, “If I do not the works of my Father, believe me not. But if I do, though ye believe not me, believe the works; that ye may know and believe, that the Father is in me, and I in him.’ All this implies, as distinctly as language can, that Christ considered himself as one being, and his Father, as another. If, in this whole paragraph, he does not speak of two distinct beings, it is impossible to
know by any language, when two beings are spoken of. As a further proof, that Christ and the Father are not one being, I would observe,
  
Secondly, that, through the whole of the New Testament, they are uniformly represented as two. One is said to have been with the other; to have been sent by the other; to return to the other; to know and love the other; to do the will of the other; and to receive power from the other. If the language of the scriptures does not prove, that the Father is one being, and the Son another; every individual mentioned in the bible may be the same; or rather nothing can be known by language. We cannot have more evidence, that David was a different man from Solomon; than we have, that the Father is a different being from the Son. If it be irrational to suppose, that any being sends himself, commands himself, prays to himself, comes from himself, returns to himself, is the son of himself, and the father of himself, sits on the right hand of himself, gives power to himself, and receives power from himself; then it is irrational to suppose, that Christ and the Father are the same being. If it be said, this is human reasoning, and must not be set in opposition to an express declaration of Christ; I reply; this objection may be worthy of consideration, when Trinitarians cease to reason. If the terms, Father and Son, do not denote two distinct beings, they are only two names, given to the same being; and in this case, either of the names may be used without changing the truth of what is said; or all, that is true respecting the Son, is equally true respecting the Father. The Son became a partaker of flesh and blood; was born; is the only mediator between God and men; was anointed with the Holy Ghost and with power; suffered and died; rose from the dead. If the Father be the same being with the Son, all this is equally true of the Father. If any thing, which our Saviour ever said, or which any sacred writer ever said respecting him, was intended to prove, that he and the Father are one and the same being, these consequences will necessarily follow; because it is impossible, that the same being should be born, and not be born; should be mediator, and not be mediator; should suffer, and not suffer; should rise from the dead, and not rise. As a further proof that Christ and the Father are not one being, I would observe,

Thirdly, that language, similar to the text, is used in other cases, where no person supposes, that any such idea is conveyed; and where, by universal consent, nothing more than a moral union is intended. Christ said; “I and my Father are one.' We have no doubt of the truth of this assertion. The only question is; what does it mean? To decide this question, we should have recourse to other passages, where similar language is employed. With such we are furnished from the mouth of Christ himself. He prayed for his disciples; ‘That they all may be one; as thou Father, art in me, and I in thee; that they also may be one in us. And the glory, which thou gavest me, I have given them; that they may be one, even as we are one.' Now, if this language does not prove, that all the disciples are one being; the text does not prove, that Christ and the Father are one being. If the language in the former instance, refers merely to a union of affection, interests, purposes; why does it not refer to a similar union in the latter? Would it be more repugnant to the dictates of common sense, to reason seriously in support of the doctrine, that all the disciples of Christ are mysteriously one man; than to reason seriously in favour of the doctrine, that Christ and the Father are one God If there be nothing in the latter doctrine, incapable of being proved; neither is there in the former. If one rest on the declaration of Christ; so does the other. If mystery be a sufficient shield for the one; so it is for the other.

St. Paul said; “I have planted; Apollos watered. Now he that planteth and he that watereth, are one.’ I and Apollos are one. One in what sense One apostle; one man; one person? Certainly not. Whatever else St. Paul meant, he could not intend to convey this idea. They were one, as to the object, which they had in view; the work which they were accomplishing. The same questions are applicable in relation to the text. “I and my Father are one.” One, in what respect? One God; one Being? Surely not. Whatever other meaning should be attributed to the passage; this cannot be its import.

It is not once asserted in the scriptures, that Christ and the Father are one being, or one God. In every place, where this is supposed to be implied, the supposition is adopted without necessity, and in opposition to the current language of the bible. The words of Christ to Philip; “he that hath seen me, hath seen the Father,’ are thought by some to imply this doctrine. But this mode of reasoning would prove, that Christ and the apostles are one being; for he said to them, “he that heareth you, heareth me.” If the inference be unwarrantable in the latter case it is equally so in the former; for the mode of expression is the same in both.

The first verse in John's Gospel is frequently quoted to prove, that Christ and the Father are one God. “The word was with God, and the word was God.” Any mode of interpretation, which is consistent with the use of language, and which will render this passage agreeable to the general tenor of scripture, should be preferred to the literal meaning. It has been already observed, that our Saviour authorized the application of the name, god, to inferior beings. “Is it not written in your law, I said, ye are gods?' Each one, addressed, then, was a god. It is, therefore, strictly conformable to the scriptural use of language to render this passage as follows:—‘The word was with God, and the word was a god.’ He was one of those beings, to whom this title was applicable.— The foregoing translation is exactly suited to the original of the passage. But, if the common translation be preferred, we are under no necessity of understanding the latter clause in the literal sense. Christ said, ‘this is my body; this is my blood.' St. Paul, speaking of the rock, which followed the Israelites, said;— 'that rock was Christ.’ In these three plain assertions, the meaning simply is:—this represents my body; this represents my blood; that rock represented Christ.’ Let a similar explanation be given to the phrase; “the word was God; and the difficulty vanishes. ‘The word was with God; and the word represented God.” This agrees with the declaration of St. Paul, that Christ 'is the image of the invisible God.' Is this taking an unauthorized liberty with the passage? Is this taking greater liberty with the passage, than Trinitarians take with one before quoted; “My Father is greater than I?” May not Roman Catholics bring the same charge against Protestants, in reference to the words; ‘this is my body?'

We are often referred to the following passage in Isaiah, as proving, beyond a doubt, that Christ and the Father are one God.— “And his name shall be called Wonderful, Counsellor, the mighty God, the everlasting Father, the Prince of Peace.” Of this passage, a late writer [Rev. Mr. Sparks, of Baltimore] has given the following translation, derived, as he observes, from the critical expositions of Trinitarians, “And his name shall be called Wonderful, Divine Counsellor, Mighty, Father of the age to come, Prince of Peace.” See also http://newworldtranslation.blogspot.com/2018/01/what-has-trinity-done-to-our-bible.html. If this be a fair translation, the passage ceases to be an argument in favour of the supreme deity of Jesus Christ. Even if the common translation be preferred, this doctrine is not supported by it. We are told by Cruden, that Elijah signifies, God the Lord; and we know it was the name of a man. If, then, a man was called, God the Lord, without actually being God; Christ might be called, the mighty God, the everlasting Father, without being the supreme God.

The following passage in St. Paul's Epistle to the Philippians, is frequently quoted to prove, that Christ is equal with the Father. ‘Let this mind be in you, which was also in Christ Jesus; who, being in the form of God, thought it not robbery to be equal with God.' It is generally admitted, I believe, that our translation of this passage is not correct; though, probably, all would not agree in any other, which could be offered. In the improved version, the passage is as follows:—‘Let this mind be in you, which was in Christ Jesus also ; who, being in the form of God, did not eagerly grasp at the resemblance to God; but divested himself of it.' Wakefield translates the passage thus; ‘Let the same disposition be in you, which was also in Christ Jesus; who, though in a divine form, did not think of eagerly retaining this divine likeness; but emptied himself of it, by taking a servant's form.' [See also http://newworldtranslation.blogspot.com/2018/01/what-has-trinity-done-to-our-bible.html] If it be said, that these are the translations of known Unitarians; I reply: our common translation is the work of known Trinitarians. If prejudice render the former suspicious; it renders the latter not less so. Macknight's translation is as follows. ‘Let this disposition be in you, which was even in Christ Jesus; who, being in the form of God, did not think it robbery to be like God.' Macknight was a learned Trinitarian; and he observes, that Whitby has proved in the clearest manner, that the original word rendered, equal, is used in the Greek version of the Old Testament, to express likeness but not equality. Whatever may be thought of the comparative merit of these different translations; it seems evident from the whole passage, that the apostle here speaks of two distinct beings; of whom, one only is the supreme God, and the other bears a resemblance to God; such a resemblance, however, that he was capable of undergoing the greatest changes, and did actually die. You will observe, the apostle does not say, that Christ thought it not robbery to be equal with the Father, or like the Father. Had this been his language, it would probably have been said, that he teaches us the equality between the first and second persons in the Godhead. He uses the term, God; and thus shows, that Christ is a being distinct from God, not a person in the divine nature. Whether it can be supposed, that one divine person is equal to another, or not; does any man believe, that any being can, with truth and propriety, be said ‘to be equal with God?”

The following words of St. John have been thought to prove, that Christ is the true God. “We are in him that is true, even in his Son Jesus Christ. This is the true God and eternal life.” But it does not appear, that this last clause refers to Jesus Christ. The word, this, may as well relate to him that is true; and this seems the more natural construction. We are in him that is true, or in the true one, even in the Son of him (that is true.) This is the true God and eternal life. To say the least, there is no conclusive evidence, to show, that the apostle here meant to assert the supreme divinity of Jesus Christ. That this was not his design will appear, if we consider,

Fourthly, that in several passages of scripture the Father alone is declared to be God. Our Lord, addressing his Father, said:— ‘This is life eternal, that they might know thee, the only true God, and Jesus Christ, whom thou hast sent.” This is addressed to the Father, whom all admit to be but one person; and he is expressly said to be the only true God. To represent St. John as asserting, that Jesus Christ is the true God, is to represent him as contradicting the plain declaration of our Lord himself; for, if Christ be the true God, then the Father is not the only true God. The words of Christ necessarily exclude every person, human or divine, from being the true God, except the Father, to whom his prayer was offered. The language of St. Paul is equally explicit. “Then cometh the end, when he (Christ) shall have delivered up the kingdom to God, even the Father.” As if on purpose to exclude the notion, that Christ will retain the kingdom as God, though he will relinquish it as man, or as mediator, the apostle has expressly told us, that Christ will deliver up the kingdom to God, the Father. He has thus limited the former term by the latter. The kingdom will not be delivered up to God the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, or to a triune God: but to God even the Father. “For, though there be, that are called gods, whether in heaven, or in earth; but to us there is but one God, the Father; and one Lord, Jesus Christ.' No language could express more accurately the sentiments of Unitarians, respecting the unity of God. We are not under the necessity of correcting the expression of the apostle, or of making any addition to it, in order to convey our opinions. In this plain and decisive manner, are we taught, that the Father is the only true God: and that Jesus Christ is another being, distinct from him.

If any further proof were necessary to show, that Christ and the Father are not one being, I might refer you to such expressions as the following. “Why callest thou me good? None is good, but one; that is, God. All are yours; and ye are Christ's; and Christ is God's. The head of every man is Christ; and the head of Christ is God. One Lord, one faith, one baptism, one God and Father of all. For there is one God, and one Mediator between God and men, the man Christ Jesus.” If, then, he who sends, be not the same with him, who is sent; if he who prays, be not the same with him, to whom the prayer is offered; if he who gave his only begotten Son, be not the Son, thus given; if he, by whose power Christ was raised from the dead, be not the same with him, who thus arose; if he, who exalted Christ at his own right hand, be not the same with him, who was thus exalted; if he, who, at the end, will receive the kingdom, be not the same with him, who will then deliver up the kingdom; it follows, that Christ is one being; and the Father, another.

It may be thought by some, that I have been attempting to prove what is self-evident; what is intuitively certain; what no person can doubt. I would remind them, however, that there are multitudes, who hold, as one of the essential doctrines of the gospel, that Christ and the Father are one and the same being, one and the same God. It is true, they admit that Christ and the Father are two distinct persons. But, if to be two distinct persons, is any thing less, than to be two distinct beings, the same difficulties still remain; for in this case the same being sent himself, was the son of himself, &c. Until Trinitarians will explain the difference between two distinct persons, and two distinct beings, in relation to this subject, I must believe, that there is no difference; especially as the scriptures have given no intimation of any such thing. As we profess to take them for our guide, in all matters of faith and duty, let us study them with diligence, care, and impartiality. Let us imbibe the spirit, which they inculcate; and, while we dare to think for ourselves, unshackled by human creeds, and uninfluenced by human authority or human censure, let us freely concede to others, what we claim for ourselves; and never, either in our words or actions, condemn them for the errors, which they may embrace. - metatron3@gmail.com

Tuesday, February 20, 2018

Matthew 25:46 and the word KOLASIN By James T. Haley 1911


Matthew 25:46 and the word KOLASIN By James T. Haley 1911

We [now] refer to the Greek word kolasin, translated "punishments" in verse 46. This word has not in it the remotest idea of torment. Its primary signifisation is to cut off or prune or lop off, as in the pruning of trees, and a secondary meaning is to restrain. The wicked will be everlastingly restrained, cut off from life in the second death. Illustrations of the use of kolasin can easily be had from Greek classical writings. The Greek word for "torment" is basinos, a word totally unrelated to the word kolasin.

Kolasin, the word used in Matthew 25: 46, occurs in but one other place in the Bible—viz., 1 John 4: 18, where it is improperly rendered "torment" in the common version; whereas it should read: "Fear hath restraint." Those who possess a copy of Young's Analytical Concordance will see from it (page 995) that the definition of the word kolasin is "pruning, restraining, restraint." And the author of the "Emphatic Diaglott," after translating kolasin in Matthew 20: 46 by the words "cutting off," says in a footnote: "The common version and many modern ones render kolasin aionios 'everlasting punishment,' conveying the idea, as generally interpreted, of basinos, torment, Kolasin in its various forms occurs in only three other places in the New Testament: Acts 4: 21; 2 Peter 2: 9; 1 John 4: 18. It is derived from kolazoo, which signifies (1) to cut off, as lopping off branches of trees; to prune. (2) To restrain, to repress. The Greeks write: 'The charioteer restrains [kalazei] his fiery steeds.' (3) To chastise, to punish. To cut off an individual from life or from society, or even to restrain, is esteemed as a punishment. Hence has arisen this third or metaphorical use of the word. The primary signification has been adopted [in the 'Diaglott'] because it agrees better with the second member of the sentence, thus preserving the force and beauty of the antithesis. The righteous go to life; the wicked, to the cutting off from life—death." (2 Thess. 1:9.)

Now consider carefully the text and not the antithesis, the contrast shown between the reward of the sheep and the reward of the goats, which the correct idea of kolasin gives. The one class goes into everlasting life, while the other is everlastingly cut off from life, forever restrained in death. And this exactly agrees with what the Scriptures everywhere else declare concerning the wages or penalty of willful sin.

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Monday, February 19, 2018

The Herald of Gospel Liberty (1904) and John 1:1

See image above. I found this very interesting answer in regards to John 1:1:

Please explain John 1:1 through the Herald.~A.O. Jacobs, Newton, Illinois

Answer: The best explanation is a true translation, more in harmony with the Greek of John and with his doctrine. The passage might better have been rendered thus: In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was a divine being. For the literal translation of the language of John is this: "In (a) beginning was the Word, and the word was with the God, and the Word was (a) god. He was in a beginning with the God.
"

The Herald of Gospel Liberty is "what some claim was the first religious newspaper in the world. The Herald of Gospel Liberty played a formative role in the Christian Church that became part of the UCC" (United Church of Christ).
http://www.ucc.org/200-years-and-counting-the 

Sunday, February 18, 2018

The Attack on Hobby Lobby Is Incoherent and Unjust

The mainstream press has accused Hobby Lobby, a great and beloved American company, of hypocrisy, unchristian behavior, smuggling, stealing, and even funding terrorism. As punishment, and concluding an investigation that has been going on for six years, the US government has extracted from the company a fine of $3 million, and the company is sending to the government property it bought fair and square.

What Hobby Lobby was doing could have finally saved this sacred history on behalf of the whole of humanity.

What horrible things did the company do? It purchased from sketchy sources in the Middle East thousands of ancient artifacts, including extremely rare cuneiform tablets. The purpose of such purchases – the Green family that owns Hobby Lobby spent its own money – is to complete an exciting project in the nation’s capital, the building of a new museum called the Museum of the Bible that will be open to the public in November.


For its efforts to save ancient historical artifacts and put them on display for educational purposes, the company has been declared guilty of trafficking war loot. And the property it bought? It is presumably going to be owned now by the US government – and maybe put in a warehouse and forgotten, like the disgraceful scene from the Raiders of the Lost Ark.

The War Caused This
And yet, it was the chaos of the Iraq War itself that brought these artifacts to the black markets to begin with. Previously, one supposes, they were claimed by Saddam Hussein as the national property of the government that the U.S. overthrew. They were pillaged by traders in the midst of the confusion that the US had not properly prepared for. This was nearly 15 years ago, and, presumably, the artifacts have changed hands many times.

Hobby Lobby deserves praise, not condemnation, for these actions.

Given how valuable these items are, and how little care the US government showed them, there is a sense in which the black market deserves praise. There was no longer a regime in place to claim ownership. The treasures were not destroyed or forgotten. Rather, they were preserved in the care of new owners and traders who understood their value – far more so than the marauding occupiers who allowed a birthplace of civilization to be pillaged without a thought.


Hobby Lobby – scrupulously and motivated by genuine piety – was only seeking to recover them and put them on display to increase public awareness of their value and what they represent. It is not the company’s fault that these treasures were floating around and changing hands all over the Middle East. Hobby Lobby didn’t cause the war. It didn’t steal a single thing from anyone. What the company was doing was systematically buying them from criminals, gangs, and shadowy forces with an eye toward keeping them safe and showing them to the public.

Hobby Lobby deserves praise, not condemnation, for these actions.

The most preposterous claim is that what the company did was unchristian. This is a jab at the company culture, of course, which is openly evangelical and has otherwise embroiled the company in public controversy. The Supreme Court decided in favor of its claim that it should not be forced to provide medical services to its employees. It was the first time in US history that the courts said that a for-profit company enjoys certain rights to religious liberty – and the partisans of Obamacare have never forgiven the company for that reason.

It’s like the whole of the social-democratic opinion cartel got on board with a plan: get Hobby Lobby!

False Records
What about the claim that there was fraud involved in the shipping of items themselves? According to reports, the company acquiesced to falsified shipping records in order to disguise the contents of the packages.

Hobby Lobby wasn’t stealing; it is being stolen from.

This strikes me not as fraud – who is actually being defrauded here? – but rather very smart and strategic behavior. What was the company to do? Put a big stamp on the packages that says PRICELESS ARTIFACTS FROM ANTIQUITY INSIDE? The efforts to disguise the contents were consistent with the care that the company was taking with the property that it justly acquired on the market.


In fact, by not insuring the contents as much as the shippers might have been willing to cover, the company was bearing the full liability that would have been associated with theft. Therefore it had every incentive to obscure the nature of the contents. No one got hurt by their doing so.

Making the Market
But there is yet another claim making the rounds. In the words of professional Hobby Lobby haters Joel Baden and Candida Moss:

The black market has done more for the cause of historical preservation than either Saddam Hussein or the occupying military forces ever did.

If collectors like the Green family were unwilling to purchase unprovenanced antiquities — items that do not have a clear and clean history of discovery and purchase — the black market would dry up. As long as there are buyers, there will be sellers. It is because collectors like Hobby Lobby are willing to pay a premium and look the other way that looting continues. They dramatically expanded the market for biblical antiquities in the late 2000s.


This is just crazy talk. Are we really supposed to believe that if the Greens had not put a value on ancient Mesopotamian artifacts that these items would thereby fall in value for everyone else? This is preposterous actually. And think about this: if the treasures actually fall to zero price, there would be no incentive to care for them and display them for the public. It is precisely because The Green family and so many others value them that they have been preserved.

These writers are living in a fantasy world. Actually, the black market has done more for the cause of historical preservation than either Saddam Hussein or the occupying military forces ever did.

Ownership Records
There is the final matter of ownership records. These are obviously controversial for property that is, after all, thousands of years old. What to do? Hobby Lobby had the right solution: they should be owned by the highest bidder and displayed for the edification of the public. As a private enterprise, it could have experimented with using the right technology – blockchain – to create immutable records, along with the complete history. That way, there would never again be a controversy.

Much the same is already being done in the art world to prevent forgeries, track ownership, and verify the authenticity of works of art. This process needs to commence with ancient artifacts too, for the sake of posterity and the future.

What Hobby Lobby was doing could have finally saved this sacred history on behalf of the whole of humanity. Sadly, it will not be so, simply because some bureaucrats and petty pundits are working through their resentments of the company, fining them and dragging its reputation through the mud. Hobby Lobby wasn’t stealing; it is being stolen from.
Jeffrey A. Tucker
Jeffrey A. Tucker
Jeffrey Tucker is a former Director of Content for the Foundation for Economic Education. He is the Editorial Director at the American Institute for Economic Research, a managing partner of Vellum Capital, the founder of Liberty.me, Distinguished Honorary Member of Mises Brazil, economics adviser to FreeSociety.com, research fellow at the Acton Institute, policy adviser of the Heartland Institute, founder of the CryptoCurrency Conference, member of the editorial board of the Molinari Review, an advisor to the blockchain application builder Factom, and author of five books, most recently Right-Wing Collectivism: The Other Threat to Liberty, with a preface by Deirdre McCloskey (FEE 2017). He has written 150 introductions to books and more than ten thousand articles appearing in the scholarly and popular press. He is available for press interviews via his email.
This article was originally published on FEE.org. Read the original article.