Friday, April 13, 2018

Justin Martyr on the Logos and the Trinity Doctrine By Alvan Lamson 1865


Justin Martyr on the Logos and the Trinity Doctrine By Alvan Lamson 1865

We proceed now to speak of the theology of Justin; and, first, of what occupies a prominent, we may say the most prominent, place in it, — his doctrine of the Logos, or divine nature of Christ, as it has been since called. The topic is one of special importance to those who would understand the theology of the Fathers, or would know what support the doctrine of the Trinity really derives from the writings of early Christian antiquity. It is a topic which, on proceeding to the inquiry how far the general belief of the Christian Church in later times is sanctioned by the authority of these writings, presents itself at the very threshold, and one on which it is desirable that we should obtain precise ideas; since, without them, the writings of the subsequent Fathers will present a labyrinth which it will not be easy to thread. But having once settled the meaning of Justin's terms, and the real purport of his opinions, we shall find some gleam of light to guide us on our way. These considerations must constitute our apology for the length of some of the discussions introduced in this and some subsequent chapters. We are aware, that, to the general reader, discussions of this sort must necessarily be somewhat dry; as is the whole subject, in fact, of the historical development of the Trinity, to which they belong. But they who would understand the theology of the Fathers have no very smooth road to travel.

The points to be settled are, in what sense Justin used the term "Logos," as applied to Jesus; what were the nature and rank assigned him by this early Father; and whence his peculiar views were derived. The great similarity between his doctrine of the Logos and that taught by Philo and the Alexandrian Platonists, is not denied. They, however, who ascribe a scriptural origin to the doctrine of the Trinity, contend that "the substance of Justin's idea of the Logos rests on a purely scriptural and Christian foundation" though they are compelled to admit that this idea was modified, and received its scientific form, through the influence of the "Alexandrian and Philonic theosophy." The early Fathers, says Semisch, from whom the expressions just, used are taken, "only poured the contents of the Scriptures into a Philonian vessel: they viewed the biblical passages through a Philonian medium. The matter of their idea of the Logos is essentially scriptural; but its construction betrays a Philonian ground-plan. Thus it is with Justin." To this statement we cannot assent. We believe, and trust that we shall be able to show, that, for the original and distinctive features of the doctrine of the Logos, as held by the learned Fathers of the second and third centuries, we must look, not to the Jewish Scriptures, nor to the teachings of Jesus and his Apostles, but to Philo and the Alexandrian Platonists. In consistency with this view, we maintain that the doctrine of the Trinity was of gradual and comparatively late formation; that it had its origin in a source entirely foreign from that of the Jewish and Christian Scriptures; that it grew up, and was ingrafted on Christianity, through the hands of the Platonizing Fathers; that in the time of Justin, and long after, the distinct nature and inferiority of the Son were universally taught; and that only the first shadowy outline of the Trinity had then become visible.

On the subject of the Logos, Justin has expressed himself much at length; and, though he is occasionally somewhat obscure and mystical, a careful examination of the several terms and illustrations he employs leaves little doubt as to his real meaning. His system presents one or two great and prominent features, which we can hardly fail to seize, and which will serve as the basis of our future reasonings. Before we proceed to our citations, however, we must request our readers to bear in mind, that both Jews and Heathens constantly alleged the humble origin and ignominious death of Jesus as a reproach on Christianity. Other sects borrowed lustre from the names of their founders; but the "new superstition," as it was called, which now began widely to diffuse itself, was derived, as it was urged, from an obscure individual, who perished as a malefactor, with every mark of ignominy. This stigma Paul had disregarded: he gloried in what was "to the Jews a stumbling-block, and to the Greeks foolishness." But the Christians of Justin's time occupied a different position; and whether or not the learned defenders of Christianity, in what they taught of the preexistent Logos, and the great stress they laid on the miraculous birth, were, as has been maintained, influenced, consciously or unconsciously, by a desire to wipe off the reproach of the cross, certain it is, their doctrines had a tendency this way. Both the Jewish and the Heathen objections were, to a certain extent, met by the doctrine of the Logos.

Let us see what Justin says of the Logos. In his second Apology he speaks of the "Son" as the "Logos, that, before created things, was with God, and begotten, when, through him, he [God] in the beginning created and adorned all things." The meaning is, that he was converted into a real being, having a separate personal subsistence, at the time God, using him as his instrument, was about to proceed to the work of creation. That this is the meaning is obvious from the use of the term "when" (we use Otto's text): he was begotten of God "when through him he created and embellished all things,"—language which makes the two acts almost simultaneous, the one taking place immediately before the other. The doctrine of the "eternal generation" of the Son is excluded: this was no doctrine of Justin. The attribute, like all the divine attributes, was eternal; but it became hypostatized, or converted into a real person, in time; that is, just before the creation of the world. Justin elsewhere, as we shall presently see, speaks of the Son as the "beginning" of God's "ways to his works."

Again: Justin says, "In the beginning" (or, as Otto understands it, "As the beginning"), "before all creatures, God begat of himself a certain rational power, which, by the Holy Spirit, is also called the Glory of the Lord, — now Son, now Wisdom, now Angel, now God, now Lord, and Logos (reason, wisdom, or speech); and by himself is called Chief Captain (Captain of the host, Josh. v. 14), when in the form of man he appears to Joshua, the son of Nun: for all these appellations he has, because he ministers to the will of the Father, and, by the volition of the Father, was begotten." [Dial, cum Tryph., c. 61, Otto. "In," or "As the beginning," or God so making a beginning, this being the first act of creation. See Otto's note.] To explain this process of generation, Justin takes the examples of human speech and of fire. "For, in uttering speech" (logos), he says, "we beget speech; yet not by abscission, so that the speech (logos) that is in us," or power of speech, or reason whence speech proceeds, "is by this act diminished." So, too, he adds, "One torch is lighted from another, without diminishing that from which it is lighted; but the latter remaining unaltered, that which is lighted from it exists and appears, without lessening that whence it was lighted." These are intended to be illustrations of the mode in which the Son is produced from the Father. In confirmation of his views, Justin quotes from the Septuagint version the passage in Proverbs, in which Wisdom, by which he supposes is meant the Son, is represented as saying, "The Lord created me the beginning of his ways to his works: before the ages he founded me; in the beginning, before he made the earth or the abyss, before the hills, he begat me." [Prov. viii. 22-36: "The Lord created me the beginning of his ways," etc. So Origen and Tertullian, as well as Justin, understood the passage. See Otto, in he., notes 1 and 12. Tertullian (Adv. Hermog., c. 8) saye expressly, "There was a time when the Son was not."] This Wisdom Justin regarded as God's offspring, produced as above described; and him, this first of his productions, he supposes God to address, when he says (Gen. i. 26), "Let us make man in our own image." [Dial., pp. 158, 159; Thirlby, pp. 266, 268; Otto, c. 62.]

Language similar to the above occurs in the first Apology, with an additional observation worthy of notice. Christ is "the first-born of God, and that reason [logos, ambiguous in the original, meaning either reason or speech, word] of which the whole human race partakes; and those who have lived according to reason are Christians, though esteemed atheists. Such among the Greeks were Socrates and Heraclitus, and others like them; and, among the Barbarians, Abraham, Ananias, Azarias, Misael, Elias, and many others." So, in the second Apology, we are told that Socrates "knew Christ in part; for he is that reason (logos) which is in all": and whatever was well said or done by philosophers and legislators is to be attributed to the Logos in part shared by them. He calls it the "insown" or "implanted" logos, or reason; of the seed of which all possess some portion. These and other equivalent expressions occur more than once. They seem intended to refer to a principle different from the ordinary faculty of reason in man; that is, to a peculiarly existing

Logos, or reason, which has in its nature something divine, being derived immediately from God. This Logos was Christ, who afterwards became flesh. It guided Abraham and the patriarchs; inspired the prophets: and the seed of it being implanted, as just said, in every mind, all, as well illiterate as philosophers, who in former ages obeyed its impulse, were partakers of Christ, the Son of God; and might therefore be called Christians, and, as such, were entitled to salvation. The Gentile philosophers and legislators, knowing the Logos only in part, fell into error; but Christ is the "whole Logos," which Christians possess, and are therefore more enlightened.

That Justin believed this divine principle of reason to be converted into a real being, the following passage, among numerous others, plainly and expressly shows. We give the passage, which in the original is exceedingly prolix, in an epitomized form, but without injury, we believe, to the sense. There are, he says, some who suppose that the Son is only a virtue or energy of the Father, emitted as occasion requires, and then again recalled: as, for example, when it comes to announce the commands of the Father, and is therefore called a messenger; or when it bears the Father's discourse to men, and is then called Logos. They, as he observes, think that the Son is inseparable from the Father, as the light of the sun on the earth is inseparable from the sun which is in the heaTens, and is withdrawn with it at its setting. But from these, he tells us, he differs. Angels have a separate and permanent existence: so this virtue, which the prophetic spirit calls God and Angel, is not, as the light of the sun, to be distinguished from the Father in name only, but is something numerically different; that is, it is not the Father under another name, but a real being, wholly distinct from him.

Justin frequently draws comparisons and illustrations from the Heathen mythology. The following, in which Mercury is introduced, presents a coincidence of language a little remarkable: "When we say that Jesus Christ, our teacher, was the Logos, the first progeny of God, born without commixtion; that he was crucified, and died, and arose, and ascended into heaven, — we affirm nothing different from what is said by you of the sons of Jove, and nothing new. You know how many sons your esteemed writers attribute to him. There is Mercury, the interpreting logos, and teacher of all; Aesculapius," and the rest; between whom and Jesus, Justin proceeds to draw a parallel.

Again: speaking of the generation of the Son, he says, "When we call him the Logos of God, born of him in a peculiar manner, and out of the course of ordinary births, we speak a common language with you, who call Mercury the angelic logos from God." The meaning seems to be: "We speak of a true and real person, so born, as we have «aid, whom we call Logos (speech): a term you apply to Mercury."

From the extracts above given, it is evident, that, although Justin employs the term "Logos" in different senses, the primary meaning he usually attributes to it, when used with reference to God, is reason, considered as an attribute of the Father; and that, by the generation of the Son, he understood the conversion of this attribute into a real person. The Logos, which afterwards became flesh, originally existed in God as his reason, or perhaps his wisdom or energy. Having so existed from eternity, it was, a little before the creation of the world, voluntarily begotten, thrown out, or emitted, by the Father, or proceeded from him; for these terms are used indiscriminately to express the generation of the Son, or the process by which what before was a quality acquired a distinct personal subsistence. That such was the doctrine of Justin, and of the ante-Nicene Fathers generally, concerning the generation of the Son, the whole strain of their writings affords abundant evidence. They supposed, we repeat, that the logos, or reason, which once constituted an attribute of the Father, was at length converted into a real being, and that this was done by a voluntary act of the Father. To this process they applied the term "generation," and sometimes "emission" or "prolation"; nor do they appear originally to have objected to that of "creation."
[Trypho is allowed, without contradiction, to speak of Christ as "made by God" (Dial, cum Tryph., c. 64). Tatian calls him the "first-begotten work of the Father," ERGON PRWTOTOKON TOU PATROS (Orat. ad Graec., c. 5).

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